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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
VERDA LYNN dba LYNN REALTY
and UNITED FARM AGENCY, INC.,
a Utah Corportion,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.

Case No.

10611

K. C. RANCHES, INC., a Utah

Corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs and Respondents as Real Estate Brokers and agents have sued K. C. Ranches, Inc., for
a real estate commission based upon a listing agreement, and upon the signing of an Earnest Money
Receipt and offer to purchase, and the said K. C.
Ranches, Inc., contends there was no binding agreement or meeting of the minds in regard to the matter and thus no commission is payable.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The District Court of Salt Lake County, sitting
without a jury, rendered judgment in favor of Plaintiffs for a real estate commission in the sum of
$15,950.000 together with interest in the sum of
$797.50.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant and Appellant seeks an order of
the Court that no real estate commission was earned
or payable and in no event was binding on K. C.
Ranches, Inc., and consequently the judgment rendered in the lower court should be reversed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about April 23, 1965, Mary H. Bennett,
Secretary of K. C. Ranches, Inc., a Corporation, entered into a listing agreement with United Farm
Agency (Exhibit P-1) for the sale of about 884 acres
of ranch type property located near Roosevelt, Utah.
The terms of the sale as listed include a sale price
at $135,000.00 with 29 % to be paid as a down payment, being $39,150.00 cash.
On or about May 17, 1965, Verda Lynn, dba
as Lynn Realty, presented to Mary H. Bennett an
Earnest Money Receipt and offer to purchase (Exhibit P-2). At the time the offer was presented to
Mary H. Bennett, it contained the signatures of the
prospective purchasers, James L. and George G.
Gamble in two places ( R. 40, 41) . The offer provided for no earnest money payment to go to sellers
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as consideration, no cash down, but an interest in
land, to be traded, which was located in Davis County, Utah, by June 1, 1965. The sale price for the
Ranch property was thus shown to be $159,500.00
and the interest in land being traded was shown at
$25,000.00.
Mary Bennett did not sign the offer or date the
same in the spaces provided for the seller, or where
the Gambles had signed. Instead Mrs. Verda Lynn
wrote in ink at the bottom of the offer "Commission
to be paid by 50% ownership in the 25 acres of land
being traded". Then Mary Bennett insisted in writing on the offer further, in her handwriting, "must
be accepted by United Farm Agency, K. C. Ranches,
Inc., Mary H. Bennett, Sec." (R-39, 40)
There was no written acceptance by United
Farm Agency or Verda Lynn dba Lynn Realty, and
whether there was any verbal acceptance is in serious
dispute, nor were there any further signatures or
initials made on the document by the prospective purchasers or other acknowledgment of acceptance by
them after the inked-in portion shown on the Earnest
Money Receipt and offer to Purchase was placed
there by the said Mary H. Bennett.
Within a matter of two days or so from May
17, 1965, Mary H. Bennett notified the prospective
purchasers and the real estate people that the transaction was off ( R 42, 43 ; 92-5 ; 93-4) . Then on May
29, 1965, a registered letter was received by United
Farm Agency from K. C. Ranches, Inc. notifying
them to withdraw the K. C. Ranches, Inc. properties
from the market, (Exhibit D-5). Thereafter, the
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prospective purchasers, Gambles, were sold another
piece of real property by the United Farm Agency
and Verda Lynn and they split the real estate commission ( Rl 02-11).
Also, K. C. Ranches, Inc. subsequently conveyed
all the properties in the name of K. C. Ranches,
Inc., including the property involved in this law
suit, to Doxey-Layton Company (R 48-19). Subsequently, Doxey-Layton Company sold all the K. C.
Ranches properties to a Mr. Mangum for approximately $137,000.00 on contract (R 47-19; 48-3).
The facts further show that K. C. Ranches,
Inc. was a Utah Corporation with 15,000 shares of
stock issued, and that the main business of the Corporation was ranching and farming (Exhibit P-3).
Also, at the time Mary H. Bennett entered into the
listing agreement with United Farm Agency as well
as the time when the offer of May 17, 1965 was
presented to her, no resolution or other Board or
corporate act authorizing the sale of the corporate
properties and assets had been entered into or passed
(R 44-22).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT AND OFFER TO PURCHASE WAS AVALID AND BONA
FIDE CONTRACT.
The question in this case does not involve the
fact of whether Plaintiffs presented a Buyer ready,
willing and able to purchase in accordance with the
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listing agreement in order to entitle them to a commission, but rather the question appears to be whether or not there was a bona fide contract actually
entered into and a meeting of the minds, on the
terms that were different from the listing agreement, between the parties concerned. This included
the Plaintiffs as well as the purchasers.
It appears to counsel for Appellant that the
purported Earnest Money Agreement fails in two
areas of contract law, to wit: ( 1) acceptance of
the offer and, ( 2) consideration.
As to the acceptance of the offer by K. C.
Ranches, Inc., as it was presented to Mary Bennett
on or about May 17, 1965, it is clear from Exhibit
P-2 and the evidence that the offer was unacceptable because of the problem of real estate commission and no cash down payment (R 55-10; 58-12;
64; 90). Consequently the fact that K. C. Ranches
did not sign where the offer called for the Seller
to sign, but instead wrote on the bottom of the offer
by hand "commission to be paid by 50% ownership
in the 25 acres of land being traded. Must be accepted
by United Farm Agency", constituted nothing more
than a counter offer on the part of K. C. Ranches,
which in turn required an additional acceptance
on the part of the purchasers, who were the original
offerors.
This is fundamental law, as stated in Volume
17, American Jurisprudence 2nd, Page 400-1, Section 62:
The rule is fundamental that an acceptance must comply with the terms of the offer
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- that is, in order to form a conti·act, the
offer and acceptance must express assent to
one and the same thing ... an offer imposes
no obligations until accepted according to its
terms, without qualification or departure.
---------------- A qualified acceptance is simply a
counteroffer - it is also a general rule that
where an offer is made to a particular person
a reply which attempts to substitute or add
another as a party to the proposed contract,
for direct performance of or participation in
the fulfillment of the obligation involved or a
material part thereof, is tantamount to a counteroffer and in effect a rejection of the offer.
In our case, not only was there a clear cut qualification imposed by K. C. Ranches, Inc., but another
party, the real estate people, were brought into the
offer, and thus a rejection of the original offer.
The question then arises, whether or not there
was an acceptance of the offeree's conditions, qualifications, and counteroffer in some way by the purchasers before the withdrawal of said counteroffer
by Mary H. Bennett.
We submit to the court that there was no such
acceptance by the Gambles, the offerors.
The usual, customary and proper way to have
shown the acceptance and consent by the Gambles
wast o have them initial or sign below the counteroffer or qualification, as they had previously done
on the offer, below the portion referring to the dairy
stock (Exhibit P-2), and especially in view of the
fact that 25 acres of land was not shown in the
original offer by the Gambles, but only a $25,000.00
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interest in land. It had to be acknowledged that it
was 25 acres and not 20 or 21 acres or some other
figure. This was not done. Nor was any other form
of acceptance shown by the offerors. In fact the only
evidence appears to be that the question of commission and trade of some 25 acres of land was still
up in the air ( R 70-21) at the time the first communication was made between Mary H. Bennett
and Jam es Gamble ( R 79-28) and this was about
two days or so following the 17th day of May, 1965.
Mr. Gamble testified as follows (R 80-22): "and I
contacted her there and asked her if she still wanted
us to come out and take over, and she said, 'NO', I
have met some complications. I will contact you
later."
Then again, on cross examination, in response
to the question about whether Mr. Gamble had anything to say about the qualifications and conditions
imposed by K. C. Ranches, Inc. on the offer as communicated to him, he answered, "I didn't say nothing. It wasn't nothing to do with me. It didn't matter to me one way or the other." ( R 82-84).
But it did matter. Some acknowledgment had to
come from them, not only as to the 25 acres being
the amount traded, but also their willingness to
deed the ownership in others than the Seller.
Thus, there was no attempt on the part of the
purchasers, offerors, to accept the counteroffer and
qualifications imposed by K. C. Ranches, Inc.
Again to cite some fundamental law, Volume 17;
American Jurisprudence, 2nd Page 405, Section
66.
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Where an offeree does not accept the offer
as made but makes a qualified or conditional
acceptance, there is no contract unless the
offeror consents to the qualification or condition tendered by the Off eree. U ndoubtedlv an
offeree has the right to make his accept~nce
depend upon any fact he might name, including the approval of the offer by his attorney.
See also annotation of cases cited in 135
ALR 822-3.
Therefore, inasmuch as Mary H. Bennett informed
the parties and Plaintiffs within a rnatte1· of a
couple of days of her withdrawal of the offe1· ::tlld
not wishing to go ahead on any deal, ( R 59-29; 8022; 92-6; 93-8), there was no binding contract entered into which would pennit a commission to be
paid.
As to the question of consideration in the off er
to purchase, there was no consideration given that
would make a binding contract between purchasers
and sellers. The only consideration mentioned or
involved was $1. 00 to Verda Lynn for presenting
the offer, and that seems questionable, but not even
that amount was to go to K. C. Ranches, Inc. to
apply on, and as consideration in the transactio~1.
as.noted from exhibit P-2. Furthermore, on a $159
500.00 deal there appeared no way to charge the
p-µrchaser with any damages if they had chosen to
bi1,'ck out of the transaction, because there was absolutely nothing paid dovm to bind the deal, to use
as Jiquidated chu•·wges as the agreement called for,
and there was no attached inventory of equipment
or. livestock, making the off e1· completely uncertain
1-
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and again providing an escape for the purchasers if
they so desired.
There was not only an insufficiency of money
or moneys worth with this size of a transaction, but
there was no benefit to the promisor or detriment
to the promisee involved, and certainly nothing moving, as consideration, to the Seller. Consequently
there was no binding contract, and Plaintiffs earned
no comm1ss10n.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT
THERE WAS AN ACCEPTANCE BY UNITED
FARM AGENCY OF THE CONDITION AND
Q U A L I F I C A T I 0 N IMPOSED BY K. C.
RANCHES, INC. IN THE OFFER.
The terms of the offer presented to Mary H.
Bennett for K. C. Ranches, Inc. were considerably
different than the terms on the listing agreement
(Exhibit P-1), and the main difference, perhaps,
was in the down payment. The listing agreement
called for 29 % down payment in cash, or $39,150.00.
The offer of May 17, 1965, called for no cash payment, but a trade of a $25,000.00 interest in land in
Davis County, Utah. So the evidence is clear that
Mary H. Bennett was seriously concerned about the
payment of a $15,950.00 commission, and there could
be no deal until this part of the transaction was completely cleared up ( R 57, 58, 64). Consequently, the
qualification and condition was written in on the
bottom of the offer involving the commission and
the acceptance by United Farm Agency.
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Now aside from the fact that the handwritten
portion amounted to a counteroffer which required
a further acceptance from the purchasers, Gambles,
to be binding, it also involved the attempted creation
of a new commission agreement, between K. C.
Ranches, Inc. and United Farm Agency which was
different from the listing agreement previously binding them. This new writing then, obviously required
an acceptance on the part of United Farm Agency
for the same legal reasons as set out in the argument
for Point I, herein in order to be binding and so that
the parties would not be bound or relying on the
listing agreement for the commission (Exhibit P-1).
Now the very fact that Plaintiffs have relied all
along in this lawsuit and sued upon the listing agreement (Exhibit P-1) for their commission, they conversely have not relied upon, intended to be bound
by, or accepted the new agreement purportedly made
and thus should be estopped from attempting to
collect a commission. Furthermore Plaintiff, Verda
Lynn, was never a party or involved with the listing
agreement and cannot sue thereunder. Plaintiffs did
not present a Buyer ready, willing and able to perform in accordance with the terms of the listing
agreement and cannot obtain a commission based
upon that agreement. Had Plaintiffs intended to
accept the commission agreement as purportedly
offered by K. C. Ranches, Inc. on May 17, 1965,
they would have based their lawsuit on that agreement and sued for the value of what 50% of the said
25 acres of land was reasonably worth. We believe
this is additional evidence, in addition to that which
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is set out in the record, of the non acceptance by
United Farm Agency.
Now when Mary H. Bennett insisted on writing
in the offer (R-39) "must be accepted by United
Farm Agency," this is exactly what she meant, and
this was not done, either written or any clear cut
verbal expression.
Mrs. Verda Lynn, one of the Plaintiffs, testified on direct examination in regard to the qualification on the commission, that she handed the offer
to Mary H. Bennett to sign and Mrs. Bennett said:
"This will have to be accepted by Mr. Massey" ( R
90-27). Mrs. Lynn then argued with her that she
was accepting for Mr. Massey and United Farm
Agency, but Mary H. Bennett still insisted on having
an acceptance from him (R 91-3). Then Verda Lynn
testified that she got in touch with Mr. Massey and
he was told "Will you please get in touch with her
too and tell her you have accepted it?" (R 91-20).
This was never done by Mr. Massey. Then again on
cross examination Mrs. Lynn stated in response to
the question "Why was it so strong about United
Farm Agency accepting it?" as follows: "She wasn't
that strong on the thing. We wrote it in because she
said, "I want to be sure on this!" Therefore, this
was not a matter of an agent accepting for his principal, but a clear cut intent to have an acceptance
from United Farm Agency, and that was part of
the condition and qualification. The Lower Court
found that Verda Lynn accepted for United Farm
Agency, but we submit that this was not sufficient.
There should have been a finding of whether United
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Farm Agency actually accepted. Furthermore, Marv
H. Bennett's testimony was emphatic about the fa~t
that United Farm Agency, not only finally turned
down the qualification about the new commission
arrangement ( R 43-16), but also was emphatic and
positive about their not wishing to go on the deal
unless the land was worth it and could be sold quickly, which was another condition attached to any
acceptance. (R 43-18; 56-11; 58-12; 61-4; 104-20)
Also, Mr. Massey did not fully dispute this part
of the evidence ( R 99-9; 101-26). We submit, therefore, that the matter was still left in doubt and up in
the air, and not an unqualified acceptance on the
part of United Farm Agency.
Another matter which should be mentioned
here, is as to the credibility of the testimony of Mary
H. Bennett. It should be kept in mind that counsel
for Defendant and Appellant was substituted in
the case because of the interest in the outcon1e of
the matter of Doxey-Layton Company. Mary Bennett had her own separate legal counsel. Thus, if she
was an adverse witness, she was adverse to both
sides. In order words, Mary Bennett had nothing to
gain or to lose as to that part of the evidence she
actually testified to. On the other hand, Mrs. Verda
Lynn and Mr. Jarrell Massey were directly interested and prejudiced from a monetary standpoint
about the outcome of the case. In this respect, we
submit to the Court that even greater weight and
credibility should be given the testimony of Mary H.
Bennett than the other interested parties.
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As to the nece8sity of a written acceptance by
United Farm Agency on the new commission agreement, we believe that the whole import and intent
imbodied in the condition "must be accepted", required additional signatures or written acceptance,
and especially where Mary H. Bennett was not satisfied with Verda L:)rnn's oral acceptance ( R 90-27).
This was also Mary Bennett's testimony ( R 64-30;
65-2; 105-4).
In Volume 17, American Jurisprudence 2nd,
Page 410, Section 71, it states:
A contract may be signed on condition that
it shall not take effect until others have signed
it or it may be the manifest intent of the
parties that the contract is not to be effective
until signed by all intended parties; in such
case, in the absence of any of the signatures
so required, the contract being joint, cannot
be enforced against those who did sign it.
See also Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 25-5-4 (5)
and combined 111 eta ls, Inc. vs. Bastian, 71 U.535;
267 P 1020, for necessity of a writing in such cases.
- _POINT III
THE ACTION OF MARY H. BENNETT IN
THE TRANSACTION \VAS NOT BINDING ON
THE K. C. RANCHES, INC., CORPORATION.
In response to counsel for Plaintiffs' question,
"\Vere you authorized by the Corporation to sign
this document?", Mary H. Bennett answered, "No
one had given me any authority. I took it upon myself." ( R 44-22).
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Counsel also made a point of the fact that 15,000
shares of stock had been issued, (Exhibit P-3), although Mary Bennett appeared to be the principle
stockholder.
In view of these facts and further that the real
estate transaction contemplated here involved all,
or essentially all, of the property and assets of K. C.
Ranches, Inc., Corporation, it required notice, a
proper meeting, consent and resolution of the stockholders and board of directors in order to bind the
Corporation.
Under the Utah Business Corporation Act, 1610-74 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953, it sets out
in detail the requirements which must be followed
by a corporation to authorize the sale of all, or substantially all, the property and assets of the Corporation, if not made in the usual and regular course
of its business. None of these steps was taken or
complied with by the officers or directors of K. C.
Ranches, Inc., Corporation in this case. Furthermore,
there should be no question here that the sale of
all the ranch and farm properties, equipment and
stock was not "in the usual and regular course of its
business." The purpose of the Corporation as set
out in its Articles of Incorporation on file (Article
VII ( 1) ) and as shown by (Exhibit P-3), was "to
engage in the business of farming and ranching." To
sell all of the ranch and farm properties on contract
would then actually put the corporation out of business.
Furthermore, the Articles of Incorporation on
file in the Secretary of State's Office, of the K. C.
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Ranches, Inc., show in Article X that "The Board
may not sell or exchange all of the property of the
corporation in bulk unless there shall have been prior
ratification of such action, said ratification shall
be in the form of an affirmative vote of not less
than 50 % of the outstanding capital stock of the
corporation."
Here, no Board meeting was held, no vote taken,
no ratification of the action, and thus no authorization binding the corporation in the sale.
Consequently, counsel for Appellant contends
that the action of Mary H. Bennett in the transactions could not and did not bind the Corporation,
K. C. Ranches, Inc., and Plaintiffs' judgment against
said Corpora ti on should be reversed.
See also Volume 19, American Jurisprudence
2nd, Page 911, Section 1533.
POINT IV
PLAINTIFF CANNOT CLAIM A REAL ESTATE COMMISSION BASED UPON THE LISTING AGREEMENT, AND THEY SHOULD BE
ESTOPPED FROM COLLECTING THIS COMMISSION.
The listing agreement, Exhibit P-1 Paragraph
( c) provides: "I agree to pay you forthwith as commission 1O% of the selling price, when a purchaser
is procured through you, or your representative at
the stated price and terms, or at any other price and
terms acceptable to me." Then in Paragraph ( d)
of the same agreement it provides: "If the property
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described herein is sold, during the term of this
agreement, to a purchaser procured through my own
efforts, or through any broker, agent, person or
organization other than you, I will immediately
pay you one-half the amount of commission provided
in clause (c) above." (Thus, any new commission
arrangement had to be accepted not only by Verda
Lynn, but also specifically by United Farm Agency.)
Now Verda Lynn was not a party to the listing
agreement, so any commission she might earn had
to come through United Farm Agency, or a new
agreement.
On the Earnest Money Receipt and offer to purchase, (Exhibit P-2, at line 41), it provided for an
amount to be inserted as to a commission to be paid
the selling agent. This was left blank and when the
offer was presented to Mary Bennett, the terms
were not acceptable to her and were not in accordance with the terms of the listing agreement, especially as to cash down payment. So when Mary Bennett wrote in the offer the conditions about payment
of a commission, what effect did this have on the
listing agreement, even if we assume for this argument that all parties involved had accepted the conditions on the offer? We submit that the effect would
be a new commission agreement, and would do away
with and make null and void the listing agreement
(Exhibit P-1) as it pertained to the amount of commission payable. Mary H. Bennett had refused to
pay a 10 % commission of the selling price, by this
new agreement, and so if we again assume there
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was a breach by K. C. Ranches, Inc. of the new agreement, does this mean that Plaintiffs may then revert back to the former listing agreement and sue
thereon? We think not. Plaintiffs remedy would
be to sue on the agreement and contract breached,
if any, and by not doing so we contend that Plaintiffs have waived their remedy. It is obvious, therefore, that Plaintiffs may not recover a 10% commission based upon the listing agreement, for it is
clear that this was never agreed to by the parties.
(See Miller vs. Cortese, 271 P 2nd 87 and also Cooley
vs. Frank, 235 P 2nd 446.)
As to a further argument that Plaintiffs should
be estopped from collecting this commission, we
refer the court to the evidence given by United Farm
Agency through Mr. Jarrell Massey in response to
a question put to him as to why he had not signed
his name after Mary Bennett's on the offer, wherein
he stated (R 102-7) :
It was never brought out there and never
was really considered necessary. In fact, we
went ahead and through Lynn Realty sold
these same buyers some property later, and
she went ahead and handled the arrangements
and took care of the commission split. We
didn't sign any agreement on it either.
Therefore, since these buyers pursued the matter no further, and went ahead with the purchase
of another property, and since these same Plaintiffs,
as real estate agents, each received their full commission from the sale, they have acquiesced in and
consented to the withdrawal of the K. C. Ranches,
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Inc. transaction and should be estopped from collecting another commission herein.
Furthermore, Mary H. Bennett's testimony in
her conversation with Mr. Massey of United Farm
Agency involving a possible lawsuit over commissions was as follows: (R 104-27):
. . . and he also told me whether the deal
went through or not, and he would just as
soon it didn't, because Mrs. Lynn could not
sue without his help and he says, "United
Farm Agency does not make sales, when it
isn't to the benefit of all parties concerned."
This evidence is corroborated by Mr. Massey
as shown in the Record ( R 102-22), and again at
(R 103-3) wherein Mr. Massey said "Well, let's get
one thing straight. I am not suing for a commissionn
- "as far as my bringing a suit, well, I didn't do
that. Let's put it that way."
It is therefore obvious that such a conversation
took place between Mr. Massey and Mrs. Bennett
as she testified to, and consequently Mary Bennett
was led to believe, even if there had been a valid
deal between them, that she had no concern about
a lawsuit with respect to a commission.
It would be most inequitable and unjust in view
of Plaintiffs conduct of selling and receiving a commission from Buyers on another property and their
apparent acquiescence and consent in the action and
decision of Mary Bennett to allow Plaintiffs a commission on this transaction and they should be
estopped from collecting the same.
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CONCLUSION
The law is clear that the condition and qualification set out by Mary H. Bennett on the offer of
May 17, 1965 amounted to a mere counter offer, at
most, which required an acceptance on the part of
both buyers and United Farm Agency before a binding contract could be created.
It is also clear, from the evidence, that no written acceptance of said counter proposal existedi
which we believe was required and the actual inh:nt
of the parties, nor was there any meeting of the
minds from a verbal or oral standpoint on the acceptance of the counter offer by either buyers or
Plain tiffs.
Furthermore, were we to assume a valid acceptance on the part of United Farm Agency in regard
to the commission, a new commission agreement
would have existed and Plaintiffs could not recover
any 10% commission as based upon the original
listing agreement, and in effect Plaintiffs have sued
upon the wrong contract.
It is apparent, also, from an examination of
the evidence and the Utah Business Corporation
Law, that Mary H. Bennett had no authorization of
K. C. Ranches, Inc., corporation to sell substantially
all of the corporate assets, and any agreement that
may have been attempted by the said Mary H. Bennett could have no binding affect upon the Corporation.
Finally, the fact that United Farm Agency
never did intend to sue for themselves for a commission and the fact that each of the Plaintiffs received
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a commission on the sale of other properties to these
same buyers, negates any damages to them in regard
to this transaction and it would be inequitable and
unjust for them to collect another commission here.
Clearly, therefore, the judgment of the Lower
Court should be reversed.
Respectfully Submitted,
SPAFFORD & YOUNG
Gaylen S. Young, Jr.
Attorney for Defendant
and Appellant

2188 Highland Drive
Suite 201
Salt Lake City, Utah

